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widening split since 1959, have intensified further military disassociation from the never-intimate relationship of the 1950's. These developments burden and delay, but do not completely forclose, Chinese military modernization. The course of Sino-Soviet military relations will depend upon the political relations of the two powers.
If the conflict continues to deepen, and either side feels vitally threatened by the other, even the possibility of Sino-Soviet military hostilities cannot be entirely excluded from the consideration of both parties. The release of secret Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army papers by the U.S. Department of State has disclosed a Military Affairs Committee directive of early 1961 on the need to preserve security of the Southwest and Northwest (i.e., Sino-Soviet) frontiers of China. 61 On the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the official report of the Chinese National Committee, and the concomitant press accounts, stressed that the peoples of Sinkiang "completely smashed the large-scale subversive activities and sabotage carried out by the Khrushchev revisionist group." In early 1966, the Central Committee of the CPSU, in a secret letter sent to all Party organizations in the Soviet Union and to all fraternal Communist Parties, stated that the Chinese (Communist) Government was spreading false allegations "that the Soviet Union unlawfully holds Chinese territory in the Far East," and that "the Chinese side is provoking border conflicts. Such conflicts have again increased in recent months." 65 In a statement by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi, the Chinese replied to the effect that the Russians have carried out "unbridled subversive activities in China's border areas. . . . They have deployed their troops on the Sino-Soviet border and carried out continual military maneuvers on the border, which presupposes China as the enemy."
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The same secret CPSU letter also raised two other new politico-
